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What explains the divergent political paths that the post-communist countries of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union have followed since the fall of the Berlin Wall? 
While some appear today to be consolidated democracies, others have all the features of 
consolidated autocracy. This study reviews the patterns of change and examines 
correlates of progress towards democracy. Variation across post-communist countries in 
the degree of democracy twenty years after the start of transition can be parsimoniously 
explained by two variables: the length of time the country spent under a communist 
regime and—within the former Soviet Union, but not Eastern Europe—the proportion 
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1 Measuring  democracy 
To assess the extent of change in the political systems of the former communist states 
since 1989 some metric is needed. Compiling cross-national indexes of democracy has 
become something of a new industry in recent decades, and three products have pretty 
much cornered the market. Since 1973, Freedom House, a non-profit advocacy group, 
founded in New York in 1941 to promote democracy and expand political and 
economic freedom around the world, has compiled annual ratings of the extent of 
political and civil liberties in different countries. These ratings, on a 7-point scale, are 
based, according to Freedom House, on ‘a multilayered process of analysis and 
evaluation by a team of regional experts and scholars’.1 The Polity project, begun 
around the same time by a political scientist, Ted Robert Gurr, also evaluates countries 
annually on the authority characteristics of their political regimes, rating them on a 21-
point scale that runs from -10 (a ‘fully institutionalized autocracy’) to +10 (a ‘fully 
institutionalized democracy’).2 Finally, a team at the World Bank has been compiling a 
dataset of ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’ (WGI), at first biannually and now 
annually. Among these is an index of perceived ‘voice and accountability’ in countries 
around the world. Although this is useful for various purposes, a number of features of 
the voice and accountability index render it less useful for my analysis here. First, the 
index is available only from 1996, which reduces its value for assessing the dynamics of 
post-communist transition. Second, the index aims to capture perceptions of democracy 
rather than to analyze the objective reality (unlike the Freedom House and Polity 
democracy ratings). Since it is quite likely that in the post-communist world perceptions 
diverge from the objective reality, this is a problem. Third, the index is an aggregate of 
many indivdual sources, which makes it even harder than in the other two cases to be 
sure exactly what the differences in scores across countries are measuring. (The voice 
and accountability index also includes the Freedom House data among its sources, with 
a very high weight; see Kaufmann et al. 2009: 31). Consequently, I will not discuss the 
WGI further. 
 
Two other possible sources are the measures of democracy produced by collaborators of 
Adam Przeworski and the indexes of legislative and executive electoral competitiveness 
included in the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), compiled under the leadership 
of Philip Keefer, also at the World Bank.3 The Przeworski team operationally defines 
‘democracy’ as a regime in which the chief executive and legislature are elected, in 
which more than one party is allowed to compete for office, and in which the current 
incumbents have not won three or more elections in a row. This definition deliberately 
‘errs on the conservative side’, classifying as dictatorships those regimes that enjoy 
extended popularity such as the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt after 1940, 
but all definitions run into troublesome cases. The reason I do not use this one here is 
that it is dichotomous, and so does not tell us much about the paths—gradual, 
undulating, or direct, and rapid that countries took to reach democracy. The DPI 
measures are also useful for various purposes. But they do not constitute a continuous 
                                                 
1 See Freedom House’s website 
www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=354&year=2009. 
2 For more details, see the Polity IV site at www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
3 See Przeworski et al. (2000), the DPI webpage at http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40.    2
measure of the degree of democracy and focus only on the competitiveness of elections, 
rather than a broader conception of democracy.  
 
Given the availability of two potentially valuable sources of data on the same subject, 
one might begin in at least three ways. One sensible approach is to conduct analysis 
using all available sources and emphasize results that prove robust across them (e.g. 
Pop-Eleches 2007). Another approach is to examine the methods of data collection and 
the conceptualizations of the target variables of the different data sources and decide on 
this basis which is more appropriate for a given project. A third approach is to examine 
the data themselves, checking whether the ratings are consistent with other sources of 
information about the countries in question, and whether observed objective differences 
and similarities among countries show up in the ratings. If such a ‘reality check’ casts 
doubt on the ability of a data source to accurately distinguish between countries, then 
requiring results to be robust to the use of such data is likely to lead researchers astray. 
 
Does the choice between Freedom House and Polity matter? In any given year, the two 
ratings are correlated (see Figure 1 for the 2007 scores). However, as Figure 1 shows, 
the countries to which Freedom House assigns the same score often have widely 
divergent scores on Polity’s rating. Countries given 5s by Freedom House, for instance, 
are rated everything from -7 (close to consolidated autocracy) to +7 (close to 
consolidated democracy) by Polity. Similarly, countries given the same ratings by Polity 
sometimes have quite divergent ratings on the Freedom House index. So which data one 
chooses may very well affect the results.  
 
Figure 1: Freedom House and Polity democracy ratings, 2007 
 
 
On theoretical grounds, the Polity ratings have the advantage of using a 21-point scale 
that permits finer distinctions than the 7-point Freedom House scale. What makes the 
decisive difference for me, however, is the results of the reality check. When it comes to 
the post-communist countries, the Freedom House data contain some curious anomalies. 






































































political rights scale, one step away from a pure autocracy.4 This puts it on the same 
level as the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  
 
Experts agree that Russia’s political institutions in the late Putin era fell short of the 
democratic ideal. Elections were marred by significant falsification; certain candidates 
were prevented from running; and the state media—which includes all the main national 
television channels—provided disproportionate and overwhelmingly favourable 
coverage of the incumbents. In general, direct criticism of the president and prime 
minister were strongly discouraged on the three main state-owned national television 
stations. Nevertheless, the country was governed during these years under a democratic 
constitution by a popularly elected president and parliament. Despite electoral 
irregularities, most observers agree that the results of national elections did, by and 
large, reflect popular preferences. Credible polls suggest that the popularity of 
President—and now Prime Minister—Putin was quite genuine. Freedom of the press, 
although constricted, continued to exist on the internet, in print media, on one national 
radio station, and on some local and cable television stations. In the 2008 presidential 
election, a communist, an extreme nationalist, and a centrist ran against the Kremlin-
favoured incumbent, and were given hours of free airtime on national television to 
debate each other and present their positions.5  
 
The UAE, on the other hand, is a federation of seven absolute dynastic monarchs whose 
appointees make all executive and legislative decisions. The only ‘parliament’ is a 
consultative assembly, whose members are either appointed by the emirs or chosen by a 
college of electors whom the emirs also select. According to Freedom House, there is 
evidence that ‘members of the royal family and the country’s police’ use ‘torture against 
political rivals’. In Russia, political parties are weak. In the UAE, they do not exist.6 For 
a research project which relies on making fine distinctions between countries’ political 
regimes, a rating that equates these two objectively quite different systems is not very 
useful. In 2007, Polity IV rated Russia 5, on a level with Venezuela and Ecuador, and 
UAE -8.7  
 
Another post-communist country on which the Polity and Freedom House raters differ 
is Estonia, which received a perfect political rights score of 1 from Freedom House, but 
a 6 (on the scale which runs from -10 to +10) from Polity. The reason Polity did not 
give the country a perfect score is that the Estonian authorities discriminate against their 
Russian speaking minority. In order to acquire citizenship—without which, they may 
not vote in national and EU elections or join political parties—residents must pass a 
                                                 
4 Freedom House states on its website that the rating of Russia does not include Chechnya, where 
political rights are certainly far lower than in most other parts of the country. 
5 See Treisman (2010: Chapter 10). I draw in this section on my discussion there.    
6 The information about the UAE comes from Freedom House’s own Freedom in the World 2009, 
available at www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=445.  
7 In September 2009, I contacted Freedom House to ask whether the organization genuinely thought 
Russia under Putin to be no more democratic than a federation of absolute autocrats. A representative 
explained that in Freedom House’s finer-grained sub-scores, Russia was rated slightly above the UAE, 
with a total of 8 out of 40 for political rights, compared to UAE’s 5. This is reassuring, as far as it goes. 
However, the sub-scores themselves raise additional puzzles. On the sum of the political rights subscores, 
Russia is rated lower than Mauritania, a country ruled by a military junta that had just staged a coup, 
deposing the elected president, arresting officials, and establishing control over the state broadcast media. 
On ‘electoral process’, Russia is judged on a level with Oman, where the only elections are for a 
consultative council without any legislative power.      4
demanding oral and written exam in the Estonian language. As a result, in 2006 a 
significant part of the population—nine per cent, almost 120,000 people, according to 
Estonian official statistics—remained without citizenship and thus disenfranchised.8 
Estonia has been criticized for this and for other kinds of discrimination against its 
ethnic minorities by Amnesty International, the Council of Europe, and the UN’s 
Special Rapporteur on Racism.9 One can debate the historical context and the politics of 
the Estonian authorities’ decisions. But it is hard to see how the disenfranchisment of 
almost one tenth of the population is consistent with a rating of perfect democracy.  
 
Since 1996, Freedom House has also published a more fine-grained assessment of 
democracy in the post-communist countries—the Nations in Transit rating, which is on 
a continuous scale. The late start, well into the post-communist transition, creates 
problems for using these data to study the trajectory of change. But even were it not for 
this, it turns out that the Nations in Transit scores correlate with the simple Freedom 
House political rights scores at r = 0.97. The Nations in Transit scorers evaluate four 
dimensions of democracy—the competitiveness of the political process, the degree of 
development of civil society, the independence of the media, and the quality of public 
administration and governance. Yet, with their more complex methodology, they arrive 
at almost exactly the same results. Estonia gets the second highest score of all the post-
communist countries, surpassed only by Slovenia. Russia is around the level of 
Tajikistan, which was also in the Freedom House political rights ratings on a level with 
the UAE. For these reasons, I focus in this study on the Polity data.10   
 
 
                                                 
8 ‘Estonia Today: Population by Nationality’, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://web-
static.vm.ee/static/failid/460/Nationalities.pdf.  
9 See Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2009, ‘Estonia’, 
http://report2009.amnesty.org/en/regions/europe-central-asia/estonia, and Freedom House, Freedom in 
the World 2008, ‘Estonia’, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,FREEHOU,,EST,4562d8b62,487ca209c,0.html. 
10 Even the Polity coders may not be immune from outside pressure. Shortly after I had written the first 
draft of this study, I thought to check for updates on the Polity website. To my surprise, I found that 
Polity had indeed ‘updated’ some of its figures, reducing Russia’s Polity score by one point for the entire 
period from 1992. The coders had also increased Estonia’s rating from 6 to 9, close to a perfect score. The 
only explanation Polity provided for these changes referred to information that had been widely known 
for years and already mentioned in previous Polity reports. The director of the Polity team, when I 
contacted him to ask the reasons for these changes, explained that an ongoing re-evaluation of democracy 
scores was in progress. Despite my repeated inquiries, he did not give any specific explanation for the 
changes to Russia’s and Estonia’s scores. When I asked if these might have something to do with the fact 
that since the late 1990s the project has relied on funding from the US government’s Political Instability 
Task Force, itself funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (see the Polity website 
www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), he replied: ‘As regards my response to pressure from our US 
government supporters, you can be sure that I consider their perspectives as seriously as the many 
inquiries and criticisms I receive from academics and other experts. There has never been any serious 
arm-twisting from either side; not that such tactics would be strong enough to induce me to make changes 
that I did not feel were warranted by the evidence.’ I do not doubt the integrity of the project’s director. 
However, I remain baffled by why the project would be unwilling or unable to explain why the scores of 
these countries had been changed, purportedly on the basis of information that had been well-known for 
years. In this study, I continue to use the original Polity ratings. These are certainly not perfect, but the 
apparent anomalies in the Polity codings for post-communist countries seem to me smaller than the 
anomalies in the Freedom House scores.    
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2 Transition  trajectories 
Figure 2 shows the average Polity scores for the 26 former Communist countries 
covered by the dataset from 1985 to 2007, the latest year for which data were available. 
On average, these countries experienced a surge of democratization in 1989-92, 
reaching the lower borders of what Polity classifies as ‘democracy.’ There was a slight 
reversion on average in the mid 1990s, followed by upward movement in the 2000s to 
something close to the top of the scale. By 2005, the median country had reached a 
score of 8 on the scale, on which 10 signifies a pure democracy.  
 
Figure 2: The transition from communism: average policy score of 26 former 




The jump in democracy remains impressive if we compare it to what happened in other 
countries that started towards the bottom of the Polity scale in 1985. That year, the 
communist countries studied here ranged in Polity scores between -9 (Albania) and -5 
(Yugoslavia). The dashed line in Figure 2 shows the mean Polity scores in subsequent 
years for all other countries that had Polity scores of -9 to -5 in 1985. As we see, there 
was a wave of democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s outside the communist 
world as well as within it. However, the communist countries on average reformed 
much faster and reached a higher level of democracy. The averages, however, conceal a 
great deal of variation in the transition path. And this variation correlates strongly with 
geography. Figure 3, panels a-f, shows the average path of countries’ Polity scores for 


































Figure 3a: The transition in Eastern Europe 
 
 









































Figure 3c: The transition in the Balkans 
 
 





































Figure 3e: The transition in the Caucasus 
 
 
Figure 3f: The transition in Central Asia 
 
 
From studying these graphs and those for individual countries, several patterns of political 
change emerge. The average pathway in both Eastern Europe and the Baltic might be 




































transition, becoming clearly democratic, and then stabilize at a high level, or over time 
creep even higher. This pattern fits the particular trajectories of Hungary, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Latvia, and Lithuania. At the other end of 
the spectrum, there is the failure to take off that characterizes the Central Asian states; an 
initial, relatively weak rise towards democracy, followed in the mid 1990s by reversion to 
authoritarian government. This pattern fits Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan, and Belarus. In the case of Belarus, however, the initial rise was very 
substantial (up to +7) and so was the subsequent fall after the dictator Aleksandr 
Lukashenko was elected and consolidated control. Between these two polar versions of 
transition are several more complicated ones. There is the ‘sprint, then jog, to democracy’ 
of countries for which the initial spurt takes them only part of the way, and which then 
converge gradually over the course of the 1990s and 2000s on the high level of 
democracy achieved by the East European countries. This is illustrated by the average for 
the Balkan countries, and among individual cases fits those of Romania, Albania, 
Macedonia, and Moldova. Similar in some ways is the ‘late sprint to democracy’ found in 
Croatia and Serbia; very little movement towards democracy occurs in the early 1990s but 
then after 1998 both shoot up to +7 or +8 on the scale. This might have something to do 
with the war that was taking place on or around their territories. 
 
In the final two patterns, the country stalls somewhere in the middle region. In ‘sprint to 
the edge, then stall’, countries surge in the early years to the 5-7 range that marks the 
border of democracy and then seem to get stuck there, bumping up or down a point or two 
temporarily, but neither reaching the 8-10 range of consolidated democracy nor falling 
back into clearly authoritarian territory. This trajectory is illustrated by the average for the 
countries of the European part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and fits 
the histories of Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia (if one disregards a major temporary 
reversion in 1995-98), and Estonia (which, as noted, is dragged down below its Baltic 
peers by its treatment of ethnic Russian residents). ‘Jog half-way, then stop’ is a pattern 
which may turn into either a very slow version of ‘sprint, then jog, to democracy or a slow 
version of ‘failure to take off’. It involves rising modestly to stabilize in the mid range of -
3 to +3. This pattern fits the average for the Caucasus and the individual cases of 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
 
One final point to note about the trajectories featured in Figure 3 is the very different 
levels of variation in patterns within different geographical sub-regions. At both extremes, 
variation is relatively low. In Eastern Europe and the Baltics, all countries travel in a tight 
cohort, with little difference between the most democratic and least democratic in a given 
year. To a slightly lesser degree, the Central Asian states also travel together—or rather 
fail to travel together—almost all staying towards the bottom of the scale. In the Balkans, 
the dashed lines that show the gap between the most and least democratic countries 
describe the shape of a snake that has swallowed something large. In the 1990s, countries 
in the Balkans ranged between ‘pure democracies’ such as Slovenia and close to pure 
autocracies, such as Serbia. Yet this variation disappeared after 2000. All countries 
converged on relatively high quality democracy. In the Caucasus and the European CIS, 
things remain more interesting. After the early years of democratization, the funnel 
opened up—countries ranged between very low and relatively high scores, and the large 
dispersion remains today.  
 
If there is any conclusion to be drawn from considering these trajectories, it is about the 
apparent importance of geography. In most countries of Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and   10
the Balkans, one can already say that the transition to democracy has been a success, 
although it took longer in some countries than in others, and reversions in some are still 
not ruled out. In Central Asia, attempts to build democracy have so far almost entirely 
failed, and few will probably be surprised if Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, currently in an 
institutional no-mans land, revert to join their Central Asian neighbors in consolidated 
autocracy. In between the Baltics and Central Asia—in the European CIS and the 
Caucasus—the outcomes seem to have been far less strongly predetermined. In these 
countries, the political future was much more in play. A dictator like Lukashenko could 
pull his country in a direction different from those followed by Ukraine and Russia.  
3  Explaining differences in democracy as of 2007 
Why have some of the communist countries become consolidated democracies, while 
others have reverted to authoritarian government? What can explain the noted geographical 
patterns? To explore this, I ran a number of regressions, seeking to find what factors could 
both account for the variation in the Polity scores of these countries as of 2007 and steal 
away the explanatory power of geography. The results are shown in Table 1.  
 
Many kinds of factors might have influenced the path of political transition of the 
communist countries. Some are relatively exogenous, predetermined by forces that were 
not themselves shaped by the transition itself. Others have to do with particular choices 
made by participants in the period of change. Since these are the sort of factors that 
might be reshaped by policy or short-term political conjuncture, it is natural to hope that 
they are significant so that one can devise ways to quickly reverse undesirable 
outcomes. Moving from more exogenous to more endogenous factors, I looked for 
evidence of the influence of countries’: geographical location (distance from Western 
Europe), natural endowments (since oil and minerals are often thought to predispose 
countries towards authoritarian rule), ethnic heterogeneity and religious traditions, level 
of economic development and industrialization, political legacy (for how many years 
the country had lived under communism, what empires had dominated the territory in 
the period since 1800, whether the country had enjoyed independent statehood between 
the two world wars), and political institutions in the post-communist era (parliamentary 
or presidential regime). All of these have been associated by numerous scholars with the 
quality and durability of democracy. Note first that, among the 26 post-communist 
countries for which data were available, a simple proxy for distance from Western 
Europe—I use the distance of the country’s capital from Düsseldorf, Germany—can 
account for 58 per cent of the variation (column 1). As was evident in considering 
trajectories in the previous section, the further east a communist country was, the less 
likely it was to achieve consolidated democracy by 2007. This relationship is graphed in 
Figure 4. Closeness to Western Europe might matter for at least two reasons: it might 
increase the diffusion of democratic attitudes and ideas from the West and it might 
render the country’s future integration into West European institutions such as the 
European Union more plausible (Kopstein and Reilly 2000). However, as will become 
apparent, the data suggest another interpretation.   11
Table 1: Correlates of democracy in the post-communist countries, 2007 
  Dependent variable: Polity score 2007 












  (1.34) (2.43) (2.89) (1.11) (2.19) (5.76) (1.74) (2.35) (1.54)  (1.39) 
Geography             










Düsseldorf, th. kms.  (0.62)  (0.67)  (0.88)  (0.93) (0.73) (0.70) (0.68) (0.81) (0.93)  (1.36) 
Endowments             
log of oil produced,     .011                 
1970-89    (.11)           
Historical  empire              
Habsburg     1.99          
     (2.26)          
Ottoman     2.54          
     (2.08)          
Former Soviet republic      -2.77        -3.83 
      (2.38)        (2.60) 
Independent interwar        2.48        
state       (1.58)        
Ethnicity and religion             
ethnic homogeneity 
(share of pop. of largest ethnicity)            -5.53         
        (6.59)       
Protestant  share         -0.002      
         (0.030)      
Catholic  share          0.014     
          (0.022)     
Table continues…   12
Muslim  share          -0.063  -0.01 
          (0.046)  (0.02) 
Muslim share  x former Soviet                    -0.14
c 
former  Soviet           (0.03) 
R
2  0.5847 0.5820 0.6038 0.6112 0.6069 0.5911 0.5745 0.5845 0.6203 0.7326 
N  26 25 26 26 25 25 24 25 26 26 
   
  Dependent variable: Polity score 2007 
  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)  (15)  (16)  (17) 










  (2.29) (4.19) (1.22) (5.44) (3.19) (8.21)  (5.49) (4.61) 
             
Distance from   -3.95
c -3.11
c -3.31
c -1.81  -2.89
c 1.32  1.35   
Düsseldorf, th. kms.  (0.71) (0.88) (0.82) (1.32) (0.90) (1.97)  (1.78)  
             
Muslim  share        -0.00  -0.01   
        (0.02)  (0.02)   




former Soviet          (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) 
Former Soviet republic          0.12    
        (1.67)     
Independent interwar state            0.13     
        (0.66)     
Economic development             




(0.37)            
Table continues… 
   13
                    
GDP per capita PPP 1990,  
thousand US$     
0.02 
(0.36)         
            
Agricultural value added as       -0.024           
% of GDP 1990, WDI      (0.086)           
Political institutions            
Years communist        -0.23   -0.29 -0.27 -0.21
 a 
        (0.15)   (0.22) (0.16) (0.10) 
DPI system: parl = 2, pres = 0          1.42  -0.46     
strong pres elected by parl = 1       (1.21)  (0.42)    
            
R
2 0.6058  0.5489  0.5825  0.6618  0.6082 0.7877  0.7881  0.7745 
N  25  24 25 26 25  25 26 26 
Note: OLS, robust standard errors. 
ap < 0.10, 
b p < 0.05, 
cp < 0.01. 
1Fischer and Sahay (2000); 
2WDI (2009). 
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Figure 4: Distance from Düsseldorf and Polity rating 2007 
 
 
Greater endowments of minerals, and in particular oil, have been associated with less 
democratic government (Ross 2001). To capture such effects, I used a variable 
measuring the total quantity of oil produced in the country in the years 1970-89, in 
metric tons, calculated from Michael Ross’s dataset on oil and gas. As column 2 shows, 
this did not have a statistically significant effect or affect the estimated influence of 
geography or the amount of variation explained. It might be that countries’ pre-
communist history affected the extent to which democracy developed in the post-
communist years. I classified countries on the basis of which of the three main East 
European empires—Russian, Ottoman, or Habsburg—had had the greatest influence 
over the country’s current territory during the period after 1800. (I show regressions 
using dummies for Ottoman and Habsburg domination in Table 1, column 3; Russian 
domination is the excluded category.) Inevitably, this required some perhaps arguable 
judgment calls. For instance, I classified the dominant influence over Serbia as being 
the Ottomans rather than the Habsburgs, and the main influence over Azerbaijan as 
being the Russians rather than the Ottomans. As a check, I also tried classifications that 
took into account all the empires that had controlled part or all of the territory at some 
point since 1800. In neither case did the imperial history variables prove statistically 
signficant. I also tried including dummy variables for whether the country had been a 
former Soviet republic or had had its own independent state in the interwar period. Both 
variables had the expected sign (negative for the former Soviet republics, and positive 
for interwar statehood), but neither of these was statistically significant (columns 4 and 
5). None of these historical variables caused a large drop in the coefficient on distance 
from Düsseldorf, so they do not seem to explain much of the geographical pattern.To 


















































constructed by Jim Fearon, each of which reflects the distribution of ethnic groups in 
the population as of 1990: the population shares of the largest and second largest ethnic 
groups, and an index of ethnic fractionalization. None of these was statistically 
significant, and none reduced the explanatory power of geographical location or 
increased the variation explained by much. In column 6, I show the result for the first of 
these.  
 
Religious and cultural traditions are often thought to influence the development of 
political regimes. In these regressions, the proportion of Protestants or Catholics in the 
population (as of 1980) had no evident effect, but the proportion that were Muslim 
adherents did.11 Including a measure of the share of the population that were Muslim 
adherents reduced the effect of geography by about one third. The Muslim share was 
not itself significant. However, if one breaks down the Muslims into those that live in 
the Balkans and Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and those that live in the former 
Soviet republics, on the other, a clear result emerges. Although the proportion of 
Muslim adherents in the Balkans and Eastern Europe is unrelated to the degree of 
democracy (as we might expect, given the universally high levels of democracy in these 
regions), states with more Muslim adherents in the former Soviet world were far less 
democratic (column 10). Including in the regression also a dummy for former Soviet 
republics (so as to avoid mistaking the effect of Soviet legacy for an effect of Muslim 
heritage), geographical location is no longer significant and even has a positive sign.   
 
At the start of transition, the communist countries were at very different levels of 
economic development. The association between economic development and 
democracy is one of the best known correlations in the social sciences.12 Did it make a 
difference here? Answering this is complicated by the great divergence between 
estimates of what the initial levels of real gross domestic product per capita in these 
countries were. Consider three relatively authoritative sources of estimates of countries’ 
gross domestic product, adjusted for purchasing power parity—the IMF (as published in 
Fischer and Sahay 2000), the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (which 
obtain their data from the International Comparison Program), and the estimates of 
Angus Maddison of the OECD (Maddison 2003). The estimates of Russia’s per capita 
GDP at purchasing power parity in 1989 or 1990 ranged from US$5,627 (Fischer and 
Sahay 2000: 36) to US$9,086 (WDI as of 2009), with the Maddison estimate in 
between, at US$7,773. The problem is compounded by the fact that the International 
Comparisons Program changes its retrospective estimates of GDP per capita every few 
years, sometimes by large amounts. Given this, I tried using two alternative measures; 
those of the IMF and the World Development Indicators, as of 1989-1990. Adding these 
to regressions including just distance from Düsseldorf, neither measure of national 
income per capita was significant, and neither reduced the estimated effect of location 
much. I also tried using instead a measure of the agricultural share of GDP in 1990 to 
pick up effects of initial underdevelopment, but again found no evidence that this 
mattered (columns 10-12).  
 
                                                 
11 For the proportions of Protestant and Catholic adherents, I used data from Barrett (1982). However, 
because this source gave non-credible estimates of the proportion of Muslims for some countries (e.g. 
Albania), I used data from the Association of Religion Data Archives for estimates of the Muslim share of 
the population (see www.thearda.com/internationalData/countries/Country_3_1.asp). 
12 For recent attempts to determine the direction of causation, see Boix and Stokes (2003) and Acemoglu 
et al. (2008).    16
Turning to political institutions, whether the country established a presidential, 
parliamentary, or mixed system, as coded by a team from the World Bank in the Database 
of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001), was not significant, and induced only a small 
drop in the location variable’s coefficient (column 14). However, the number of years a 
country had been communist did appear potentially important; although it was not itself 
statistically significant, including this reduced the size of the location coefficient by 
almost 50 per cent (column 13). Based on this preliminary investigation, I show some 
models including several explanatory variables in columns 15-17. First, in column 15, I 
show that once we control for Muslim religion, distinguishing between former Soviet and 
other Muslims, along with the duration of communism in the country, whether the 
country had a parliamentary or presidential system and whether the country had had an 
independent state in the interwar period were completely insignificant, the former now 
with the ‘wrong’ sign. We see in columns 15 and 16 that Muslim religion and the number 
of years under communism can completely account for the effect of location, and actually 
change the sign of its coefficient. Column 16 drops the dummy for former Soviet states, 
which is highly correlated with the number of years under communism (r = 0.84), and far 
less significant when the two are included together. Finally, column 17 shows a 
parsimonious model including just the proportion of Muslims in former Soviet states and 
the duration of communism. These variables, by themselves, can account for more than 
three-quarters of the variation in the 2007 Polity scores, including the part correlated with 
location (adding the distance from Düsseldorf increases the R-squared only slightly, and 
the variable has a counterintuitive positive sign).     
 
Table 2 shows some robustness checks, attempting to weaken the observed relationship 
between the Polity score, on the one hand, and Soviet-Muslim heritage and years under 
communism, on the other. Column 1 repeats the model from Table 1, column 17. Column 
2 adds dummy variables for the different regional subgroups. This actually increases the 
size of the coefficients on both the Soviet Muslim share and years communist, although 
the latter is no longer statistically significant. None of the regional dummies are 
significantly different from Eastern Europe, and the proportion of variation explained is 
only slightly higher. Column 3 controls for current GDP per capita, rather than GDP per 
capita at the start of transition. Counterintuitively, this turns out to be negatively 
correlated with democracy (although not statistically significant), after controlling for 
Soviet Muslim heritage and years under communism. There is no gain in explanatory 
power, and the coefficients on the two main explanatory variables are the same or slightly 
larger. In column 4, I try controlling for whether the country experienced a civil war in the 
transition period.13 The coefficient on the civil war dummy has an unexpected positive 
sign, although it is not statistically significant. Soviet Muslim tradition and communist 
legacy remained significant with coefficients that were not much changed. Column 5 
replaces the Polity score, which consists of the sum of Polity’s democracy and 
authoritarianism scores, with just the democracy score (on the 0 to 10 scale). The results 
are similar, and now 87 per cent of the variation is explained. Since the dependent 
variable is now measured on an 11-point, rather than a 21-point, scale, the coefficients 
are correspondingly somewhat smaller. Column 6 uses as dependent variable one 
                                                 
13 I coded as 1 the countries Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Russia, Serbia, and Tajikistan; as 0.5 
Macedonia, Moldova, and Slovenia; and all others as 0. Bosnia was not in the dataset because of missing 
data.    17
Table 2: Correlates of democracy, robustness checks 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable   Polity 2007  Polity 2007  Polity 2007  Polity 2007  Polity democracy score 2007  Polity parcomp 2007  Polity 1998  Polity 2007  Polity 2007 
Constant  18.13




 c  5.84
c  13.02
 b  18.63
c 9.18
 c 
  (4.61)  (7.72) (5.70) (4.55) (2.32)  (.86)  (5.39)  (4.09) (.23) 







c   -0.11
b 
   former Soviet  (.04)  (.03) (.04) (.04)  (.02)  (.01)  (.04)   (.04) 
   Years communist  -0.21
 a  -0.23 -0.23
 a -0.22
 a -0.15
 c  -0.04
b  -0.14  -0.22
b  
  (0.10)  (0.18) (0.11) (0.11) (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.11)  (0.09)  
Region dummies (E. Eur excluded)               
   Balkans    0.18             
    (0.64)             
   Baltic    0.81             
    (2.03)             
   European CIS    -0.13             
    (1.19)             
   Caucasus    2.75             
    (4.94)             
   Central Asia    2.55             
    (6.16)             
GDP per capita PPP 2007 
thousand US$
1    
-.08 




Civil war dummy       1.76          
       (1.66)          
Central Asia + Azerbaijan              -8.40
c  
Baltics + Moldova              (2.94) -1.15 
               (0.80) 
Other FSU               -5.63
a 
               (2.86) 
R
2  0.7745  0.7848 0.7434 0.7877  0.8684  0.6111  0.6028  0.7762 0.7705 
N  26  26 25 26  26  25  26  26 26 
Note: OLS, robust standard errors. 
ap < 0.10, 
b p < 0.05, 
cp < 0.01; 
1WDI (2009).  
Source: author’s calculations.  
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component of the 2007 Polity democracy score—arguably the one that is least 
subjective in the coding—the Polity measure of the competitiveness of participation 
(parcomp). Countries are rated on a five-point scale which runs from ‘repressed’—’no 
significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and ruling 
party’—to ‘competitive’—when stable and enduring political groups compete for national 
office, without much coercion or disruption. Again, the proportion of Muslims in former 
Soviet countries and the number of years under communism are significant, and they 
together explain more than 60 per cent of the variation.  
 
Column 7 examines whether the apparent effect of Muslim heritage and years under 
communism is something new that has emerged in recent years or a result that would 
also have shown up in the 1990s. I use as the dependent variable Polity’s rating as of 
1998. Again, the results are similar, although only 60 per cent of the variation is 
explained. The Soviet Muslim variable has the same coefficient, but the years under 
communism variable is somewhat smaller and no longer statistically significant. This is 
because of the former Yugoslav states of Serbia and Croatia, which were highly 
authoritarian in the 1990s despite a relatively shorter time under communism; 
controlling for the Balkans, one obtains the same coefficient on years under 
communism as before (-.21, p < 0.05).  
 
The proportion of Muslims in former Soviet republics variable singles out the Central 
Asian states plus Azerbaijan (the variable correlates with a dummy for these six states at 
r = 0.98). As might be expected given this correlation, including both in the regression, 
neither is statistically significant. Replacing the Soviet Muslim variable by the dummy 
for Central Asia plus Azerbaijan yields a marginally higher R-squared. Could there be 
some factor other than a high proportion of Muslims that unites and distinguishes these 
six states and that leads to authoritarian government? This is certainly possible. But it is 
not obvious what that other factor might be. It is not mineral wealth, since countries like 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have little in the way of mineral resources. Nor can it be 
southern location or agricultural workforce, since Armenia and Georgia are as far south 
as Azerbaijan, and Georgia and Moldova were as agricultural as the six states in 
question at the start of transition.  
 
The years communist variable might appear to be picking up just the three-way division 
between the East European and Balkan states, communized at the end of the Second 
World War, the Baltics and parts of Moldova, occupied by Stalin’s troops in 1940, and 
the other Soviet republics, incorporated into the USSR in the early 1920s. Including 
dummies for the Baltics plus Moldova and for the remaining former Soviet states yields 
an R
2 that is slightly lower than that in the column 1 model with years communist. Thus, 
it is possible that the years communist variable contains more relevant information than 
is captured by just this three-way division.   
 
To recapitulate, one can account extremely well for the variation across the post-
communist countries in levels of democracy as of 2007 with two variables, both of 
which reflect characteristics of the countries that were strongly correlated with 
geography and more or less fixed at the start of transition. Countries that had lived 
under communism for longer and—among the former Soviet republics—those which 
had more Muslim adherents tended to make a less complete transition to democracy   19
during the years between 1989 and 2007.14 Choices of the political leaders during the 
transition period appear to have been secondary, or perhaps to have been largely 
determined by these aspects of the country’s cultural and institutional legacies. Except, 
perhaps, in one case. It seems to me that the election of Aleksandr Lukashenko in 
Belarus, and the determination of this individual to impose autocratic rule, changed the 
country’s course in a quite fundamental way. If this is the case—and if our two 
explanatory variables, Muslim tradition and years communist, are the right ones—one 
should expect the relationship between these variables and the Polity score to be even 
stronger if we drop Belarus from the dataset. This is indeed the case. The R
2 rises from 
0.77 to 0.88, and both explanatory variables are much more statistically significant than 
before. 
4 Discussion   
But what does all this mean? It is one thing to estimate some regressions, another to 
believe that what they are telling is ‘the truth.’ That a Muslim tradition constitutes some 
sort of obstacle—although by no means an insuperable one—to liberal democracy 
echoes a result found by scholars who have looked at the determinants of democracy in 
broader datasets of countries (Fish 2002). Fish presents evidence that the correlation 
between Islam and authoritarianism is explained in part by the greater prevalence of 
patriarchal gender relations in the Muslim world, and refers to some other scholars who 
have argued that ‘the unusual tenacity of clan and tribal relations in Muslim societies … 
are inimical to democracy’. At least in published statistics, the huge gender gaps that 
Fish demonstrates for many Muslim countries do not show up in the former communist 
world. There is almost no literacy gap between males and females in the post-
communist countries with large Muslim populations—the Central Asian states and 
Azerbaijan. Nor do these countries have particularly low representation of women in 
parliament.  
 
The tenacity of clan networks may have more to do with it, although how exactly 
remains unclear. Within Russia, implausibly high electoral turnout and votes for central 
incumbents have become characteristic of various predominantly Muslim regions. 
Figure 5 shows the relationship for the 2004 presidential election, in which the 
incumbent, President Putin, won with 72 per cent of the valid vote nationwide. Many of 
the more egregious reports of electoral irregularities have come from traditionally 
Muslim regions like Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Chechnya.15 In these regions, governors 
have established particularly effective, and repressive, political machines. What role if 
any Islam played in this is a subject that requires further research. It is also possible that 
in this region authoritarianism has been fueled not so much by elements of Islam as by 
the fear of it, and by the attempts by incumbent regimes to protect against Islamic 
fundamentalism in anti-democratic ways. In Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the late 
1990s, leaders used arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, and expulsion to crack down on 
those believed to be potential Islamic extremists (Collins 2002; Luong 2003). Within 
Russia, this has been one of the justifications for repression in parts of the North 
Caucasus where ‘Wahhabi’ terrrorist groups have been active.  
                                                 
14 Pop-Eleches (2007) finds similarily that a Muslim religious tradition and a history of pre-Second 
World War Soviet statehood correlate with lower democracy ratings.  
15 For a review of reports of such irregularities, see Fish (2005).    20
Figure 5. Muslim population and very high votes for Putin, 2004  
 
Source: Central Electoral Commission and Goskomstat RF. 
 
The second determinant, years under communism, is plausible but vague in its 
implications. What exactly happened to countries in those additional years of 
communist rule that reduced the impetus to create effective democratic institutions after 
communism fell? Whether or not the country had been part of the Soviet Union was not 
the crucial difference.16 Nor was past experience of independent statehood (Table 1, 
column 15). Finally, I tried to see if the level of economic development of the country at 
the time of communization made a difference. Using Maddison’s data, which required 
huge approximations such as using Maddison’s estimate of average ‘USSR’ GDP per 
capita in 1913 ($1,488 1999 international Geary-Khamis dollars) for all the former 
USSR republics, I found no significant results. Perhaps better data on this would reveal 
patterns. But it is notable that the Czech Republic, by far the most developed at the time 
of communization, with estimated GDP per capita of $3,088 1990 dollars in 1948, was 
rated slightly less democratic in 2007 than Romania, which had estimated GDP per 
capita in 1946 of just $816 1990 dollars. There was great variation in the level of 
economic development among the East European countries at the time of 
communization, yet they have moved in a pack to high levels of democratic 
consolidation.  
 
In short, I have no good answer. Countries that were incorporated by the Bolsheviks 
after 1917 are today the least democratic; those that were incorporated into the Soviet 
Union during the Second World War come second; and the countries that became 
communist, but not Soviet, after the end of the Second World War are today the most 
                                                 
16 See Table 1, column 15. Adding the dummy for former Soviet republic to a model with just years 
communist and Soviet republic times Muslim adherents, the Soviet dummy was not significant and the R
2 























































democratic. Why exactly, I cannot say. In addition, post-Soviet countries where more of 
the population was traditionally Muslim are today less democratic. Again, why exactly 
is a question for further research. The strong way in which the data point towards 
historical legacies—especially in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Central Asia; less 
decisively in the European CIS and the Caucasus—is striking. It is also disappointing 
for those who hope, through policy advice, to increase the level of democracy in these 
countries in the short or medium run. So far, at least, the choices of different policies or 
of particular configurations of political institutions seem either to have been strongly 
determined by history and culture or to have mattered less than the historical contexts in 
which they were chosen.   
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